IRAQ BODY COUNT

A DOSSIER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 2003-2005
The information presented in this dossier provides a unique insight into the human consequences of the US-led invasion of Iraq. War has many costs – social, economic, and political. But the loss of life and limb is the most immediate and profound cost. This dossier focuses on the 67,365 civilians (most of them Iraqi citizens) who have been reported killed or wounded during the first two years of the ongoing conflict, up to 19 March 2005.

Our data has been extracted from a comprehensive analysis of over 10,000 press and media reports published since March 2003. Our accounting is not complete: only an in-depth, on-the-ground census could come close to achieving that. But if journalism is the first draft of history, then this dossier may claim to be an early historical analysis of the military intervention’s known human costs.

What follows is a wide-ranging and systematic analysis of data collected by the Iraq Body Count project, whose constantly updated database at www.iraqbodycount.org is documenting the rising death toll in Iraq. The report is presented as a series of fact sheets concentrating on different aspects of the data: the killed, their killers, the wounded, and the witnesses.

The continuous detailed tracking, recording, analysing, understanding, and responding to the effects of violent conflict on its innocent victims is, in our view, among the highest humanitarian imperatives, an imperative which has particular application to governments who conduct military interventions. Assurances that military forces “make every effort to avoid civilian casualties” are no substitute for real data-gathering and analysis, and can have no basis without it. On the eve of the invasion Tony Blair stated that “[Saddam Hussein] will be responsible for many, many more deaths even in one year than we will be in any conflict”. Only data such as presented here will allow a realistic evaluation of such predictions.1

This dossier demonstrates that determined internet-using citizens can obtain a more detailed picture of the effects of modern warfare than has ever been possible before. Leaders who commit troops to wars of intervention have diminishingly few excuses for failing to seriously weigh the human costs.

Hamit Dardagan, John Sloboda, Kay Williams, Peter Bagnall, July 2005.

1Hansard. 19 March 2003.
WHO WAS KILLED?

- 24,865 civilians were killed in the first two years, almost all by violence.
- 82% of those killed were adult males and 9% were adult women.
- Nearly one in ten of those killed was under the age of 18.
- Nearly one in two hundred of those killed was a baby aged 0-2.
- Most adult victims were parents leaving behind orphans and widows.

The civilian death toll
24,865 civilians have been reported killed, almost all of them as a direct result of violence, between 20 March 2003 and 19 March 2005. The population of Iraq is approximately 25,000,000, meaning that one in every thousand Iraqis has been violently killed since March 2003.

Serving military and combatant deaths are not covered in this dossier except where the dead were killed or executed after capture. There are no reliable accounts of Iraqi military or combatant deaths, either official or unofficial. Coalition military deaths, by contrast, are well documented both officially and unofficially. Such combatants are not included in our reporting. Except for a small number of foreign civilians, this dossier is solely concerned with the effect of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation on ordinary Iraqis.

Age & Gender
Age and gender information was available for 13,811 of those killed. The table above shows that 18% of these were women and children.

Gender by age
Among the adult victims (18 or over) females constitute 9.6% of deaths. Among under 18s the proportion of females killed rose to 22.7%.

Names
Media reports contain full or partial name information for 1,051 of the dead. Of the 952 for whom age information was also available, 789 were adults or elderly and 163 (17%) were children or babies.

Loss of relatives
Media reports provide substantial evidence of loss of family members. Given the high number of male adult deaths, we can know that many Iraqis have been left fatherless and widowed.

His father. His mother. Two sisters. A brother. And an uncle. All dead. That was the price of war for 15-year-old Omar when the vehicle he was riding in failed to stop at a US checkpoint five miles from Baghdad.

James Meek. Observer, 6 April 2003

An old man approached, disoriented and alone, faltering forward with his cane after three warning shots. Finally, U.S. weapons fired a burst and he fell dead.

Ellen Knickmeyer. Associated Press, 8 April 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Babies</th>
<th>51</th>
<th>0.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women including elderly</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men including elderly</td>
<td>11,281</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths with age and gender information</td>
<td>13,811</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media reports vary in the amount of detail they provide on the demographics of victims. The data presented here are calculated for the 14,220 (57%) of 24,865 killed for whom either a name or partial name, age, sex, or occupational information was available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name or partial name</th>
<th>1,051</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>2,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>13,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>13,998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are overlapping categories, but two of them (sex and age) can independently provide demographic data for over half the deaths recorded in this dossier. Additional demographic information, namely location and time of death, is available for nearly all deaths (detailed in The Killed fact sheet 2, and The Killers fact sheet 2). Occupations are further analysed in The Killed fact sheet 3.

**Age and Gender**

Press and media reports vary in the specificity of age information. For this report we have defined 0-2 as babies, 3-17 as children, 18-59 as adults, and persons 60 or older as elderly. The child/adult cutoff was selected primarily in reflection of legal conventions — in Iraq 18 is both the legal voting age and the age of consent.

Media reports provide age information on 13,998 victims (56.3% of total reported killed). The Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) provided information on the proportion of adult male, women, and child victims in its compilation of war-related deaths and injuries. These proportions were used to obtain the appropriate breakdowns for the 953 deaths contributed to this dossier by MoH between 1 May 2004 and 19 September 2004.

Of 8,913 mortuary deaths, officials reported that 90% were adult males, which is similar to the proportion recorded by MoH. The breakdown of the remaining 10% of women and children recorded by mortuaries is based on their corresponding proportions in MoH data (that is, 60:40 women:children). MoH define a child as anyone aged 11 or younger, so that — when applied to IBC data from other sources — their proportions are likely to produce a conservative estimate of the proportion of children killed.

Although ten times more adult males were killed than adult females, nearly one quarter of child and infant or baby deaths are females. This may be because young girls, like young boys, are more likely to be outside the home and so less protected from crossfire.

**Names**

A table of 3,029 named victims up to 12 September 2004, prepared in collaboration with the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) led by Raed Jarrar and the late Marla Ruzicka, is available on the Iraq Body Count website. In addition to names, the table details age, gender, date and cause of death, where known. As this data was gathered using an entirely different methodology from IBC’s this information has not been formally integrated into our compilation of deaths and injuries.

**Marital and parental status**

Media reports provide information about marital and parental status for around only 200 people. UNDP data show that by the age of 30 three-quarters of Iraqi men are married, rising to 96% by the age of 45, and that the average number of children born to each married woman is three. Given that more than 80% of the dead whose age and sex have been identified were adult males, it may be inferred that tens of thousands of women and children will have lost a husband and father to violence since March 2003, a loss which will have long-lasting psychological and economic consequences for the bereaved families.

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1. [http://www.iraqbodycount.org/names.htm](http://www.iraqbodycount.org/names.htm)

WHERE DID THEY LIVE?

- Most deaths occurred in areas where the civilian population is concentrated.
- 77% of deaths occurred in 12 cities.
- Baghdad alone accounted for almost half of all deaths.
- Al Fallujah had the second highest loss of life after Baghdad.

Geographical distribution of deaths

Although deaths occurred throughout Iraq, most occurred in highly-populated areas in and around towns and cities. The table above shows the 12 locations with the highest deaths tolls. Of the 24,865 deaths recorded by IBC between 20 March 2003 and 19 March 2005, over 77% (19,215) occurred in these 12 cities alone.

Baghdad, Iraq’s largest city as well as its capital, accounted for nearly half of all deaths: approximately one in 500 of its citizens have been killed violently since March 2003. In Al Fallujah this statistic rises to one in 136, so that except for the relatively small town of Tikrit, Al Fallujah has suffered by far the greatest loss of civilian life in proportion to its pre-war population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns and cities</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>% of national deaths</th>
<th>Population (2002 est.)</th>
<th>Deaths per 10,000</th>
<th>One in every () killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11,264</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>5,605,000</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Fallujah</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassiryah</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerbala</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>549,000</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>563,000</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1,739,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,337,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>728,000</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilla</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>524,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikrit</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba`aqubah</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly 100 villagers were killed by US bombing and strafing on April 5, including 43 in one house, for reasons that they do not understand. “There was no military base here,” says Hamadi. “We are not military personnel. This is just a peasant village.”

Amid the wreckage I counted 12 dead civilians, lying in the road or in nearby ditches. All had been trying to leave this southern town overnight, probably for fear of being killed by US helicopter attacks and heavy artillery.

x029 US Marines turn fire on civilians at the bridge of death. Mark Franchetti. Times (London), 30 March 2003
Geographical distribution
Of the 24,865 deaths in this dossier 21,588 occurred either within or near a specified town or city – 78 cities, towns, villages, and hamlets being named in all. Of those deaths for which location data was less distinct, 2,120 could be assigned to the province in which they occurred, so that a total of 23,708 deaths are identified at least to the level of province (also referred to as administrative regions or governorates). Of the remaining 1,157 deaths, 953 are based upon nation-wide data from the Iraqi Ministry of Health for the months of May, July, August and September 2004, and 141 are deaths of policemen reported killed in the country as a whole between May and December 2003.

The 12 towns which alone account for 77.3% of deaths are widely distributed among densely-populated areas, and encompass 11 of Iraq’s 18 provinces as well as all the major ethno-religious groups.

The deaths reported here follow the general pattern observed by COSIT/UNDP 2005’s nationwide household survey of war-related deaths where the distribution was 50% in southern provinces, 32% in provincial Baghdad, 16% in the centre and 2% in the north. The UNDP report does not include criminal murders from the breakdown of law and security in its survey and does not include any deaths occurring after 31 May 2004. The map above compares UNDP to IBC up to 31 May 2004 and after the subtraction of mortuary counts (which primarily record criminal murders). UNDP also includes military deaths in its count (which IBC does not), which may partly explain UNDP’s greater weighting toward the south of the country, which was the most intensely-contested route of the ground invasion.

Baghdad
The preponderance of both war and occupation-related deaths in the relatively small physical area represented by Baghdad and its governorate may be explained by a combination of the following: its population density – approximately 1/5 of Iraqis live in Baghdad so that its weighting relative to its population size is only 2 times the national average of 10 deaths per 10,000; it being the economic, political and administrative centre of the country; the concentration of crime in the city; consistent mortuary data reporting criminal murders; and that Baghdad is the best-reported of Iraq’s conflict-ridden areas.

Ethno-religious distribution
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr gave an estimate to the press of 10,500 Shiite Muslims, out of 12,000 civilians altogether, killed by insurgents over 18 months up to June 2, 2005. The breakdown by religion was based on the location of the deaths. Insofar as the vast majority of deaths in this dossier are contained in either predominantly Shia or mixed Shia/Sunni areas, Jabr’s data is consistent with our findings; however the breakdown by ethnicity/religion of the individuals killed (as distinct from the areas in which they were killed) cannot in our view be accurately determined from broad geographic demarcations alone.

Baghdad
The preponderance of both war and occupation-related deaths in the relatively small physical area represented by Baghdad and its governorate may be explained by a combination of the following: its population density – approximately 1/5 of Iraqis live in Baghdad so that its weighting relative to its population size is only 2 times the national average of 10 deaths per 10,000; it being the economic, political and administrative centre of the country; the concentration of crime in the city; consistent mortuary data reporting criminal murders; and that Baghdad is the best-reported of Iraq’s conflict-ridden areas.

This phenomenon of Baghdad-weighting was observed by the Associated Press in its June 2003 survey of invasion-related civilian deaths which had been recorded by hospitals across Iraq, in which 1,967 of 3,240 deaths (60%) were reported for the governorate of Baghdad.

3 Iraq Puts Civilian Toll at 12,000. Washington Post. 3 June 2005.
WHAT WERE THEIR OCCUPATIONS?

- Police account for the largest single occupational category among the killed, with 977 reported deaths.
- Deaths in non-targeted groups encompass a wide cross-section of Iraqi society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Categories</th>
<th>No. killed</th>
<th>Category includes (in alphabetical order):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>Bodyguard; Bomb disposal expert; Civil defence worker; Guard; Intelligence officer; Iraqi Civil Defence Corps; Police chief; Police driver; Police recruit; Police; former Police; Secret Police, former director; Security firm employee; Security guard; Security official; Workers for US or Iraqi security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (non-active)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Iraqi army recruit; Iraqi National Guard recruit; Iraqi National Guard; Iraqi soldier; Soldier; Worker for Iraqi army; Workers for US military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>Aide to al-Sadr; Aide to al-Sistani; former Baath Party members; former Baathist official; Badr organisation member; Council leader; Council member; Election candidate; Iraqi Governing Council member; Ministry official; National Assembly member; Political advisor; Political party member; Political party official; former Political party official; Politician; Trade union official; Tribal leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (and occupying powers)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Civil Servant; College head; Council worker; Diplomat; Election worker; former municipal official; Government auditor; Interpreter; Judge; Laundry worker; Local government official; Ministry employee; Municipal worker; Nuclear scientist; Press secretary; Regional government official; former Regional government official; Scientist; Teacher; University professor; Worker for interim president; Worker for US organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Alcohol vendors; Arms seller; Barber; Blacksmith; Building contractor; Businessman; Car washer; Cigarette vendor; Cleaner; Contractor; Factory employee; Garage owner; Grocer; Hotel worker; Labourer; Lawyer; Mechanic; Merchant; Moneychanger; Musician; Receptionist; Salesman; Secretary; Shoe-shine boy; Shop owner, liquor store; Shop owner; Shop worker; stallholder; Subcontractor; Tannery owner; Tea-seller; Veterinarian; Video seller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Airport employee; Bus driver; Civil aviation administration official; Driver; Taxi driver; Truck driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Cleric, Shiite; Cleric, Sunni; Missionary; Pilgrim; Worshippers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Broadcaster; Cameraman; Film maker; Journalist; Press photographer; TV journalist; TV producer; TV sound engineer; TV station employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Ambulance driver; Doctor; Health aide; Hospital administrator; Hospital employee; Medic; Nurse; Paramedic; Pharmacist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Bakery worker; Chicken farmer; Farmer; Farm worker; Fertiliser plant employee; Fisherman; Fishmonger; Restaurant owner; Restaurant worker; Shepherdess; Shepherd; Fruit vendor; Tea vendor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Student; School student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Communications company employee; Computer engineer; Computer technician; Construction equipment company employee; Construction worker; Electricity worker; Engineer; Garbage collector; Kerb painter; Oil company official; Oil worker; Sewage facility official; Sewage worker; Street cleaner; Telephone exchange worker;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Aid worker; Human rights worker; Red Crescent official; Relief worker; UN worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Military</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Former colonel; former Intelligence officer; retired Iraqi National Guard; former Iraqi soldier; former Navy employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bank robber; smuggler</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Earlier Wednesday, four Christian laundresses were killed and five others wounded when assailants raked their minibus with gunfire west of Baghdad. They were going to work at a US base near Habbaniyah.

x318 Three US soldiers killed, four Iraqi laundresses mown down. Agence France Presse, 22 January 2004
Quality of data considerations

Information was available on the occupations of 2,210 victims, or about 10% of adult victims. This is a relatively small proportion compared to the number for whom age and gender are known (see The Killed fact sheet 1). More importantly, the professions of certain deliberately targeted groups are inherently more likely to be reported, since the nature of their work has explanatory power both as an integral part of the story of their deaths and in relation to the general security crisis in Iraq. Where media-reported occupations identify the killing as conflict-related, the predominant occupations are police and security forces, officials and politically-active persons, workers for the government and providers of services to occupying military forces. Occupations which are not obviously related to the conflict may nonetheless be mentioned if they can be connected to it: all the media reports of laundresses killed have been in the context of their employment by the US military and that they were assassinated on their way to or from a US military base.

Ordinary criminal murders in Iraq are rarely reported in detail by the Western media and it is only the reporting of records kept by mortuaries which has shown that this everyday form of violence, too, has reached extraordinary levels — but such reporting again lacks information on the victims’ professions.

It is highly likely therefore that the top four groupings in this list — security, military, political, and government — do not represent the majority of all victims, and so should not be extrapolated onto the approximately 20,000 adult victims whose occupation has not been recorded in media reports. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that our database contains most security workers and contractors.

The remaining victims whose occupations are unknown are more likely to be found in the full range of occupations in the general population, rather than these targeted groups. This should be especially true of the civilians killed during the invasion phase up to May 1st 2003. Only a very few occupations were recorded during this period, as most deaths and injuries for this phase stem from hospital records. When we include occupations of the injured as well as the killed, to maximise our sample for this period, we see that deaths remain fairly evenly spread across occupational categories. The main exception to this is the special case of highly-exposed media workers whose invasion phase casualties were well-reported. What is of particular note is that the four “targeted” occupational groups (security, military, political, and government) are not yet predominant in media reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational categories</th>
<th>Killed and injured prior to 1 May 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service industry</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other reports of occupational deaths

There have been other, usually intermittent tallies of deaths within specific occupational categories. These include journalists1, medics2, and academics3. One problem reconciling these reports with IBC’s has been touched upon above: many of these victims may be included in our count with their occupation going unrecorded. Another problem is one of classification — there are widely varying tallies of media and academics in particular, which may in part be due to the application of different definitions. However these efforts show that there is scope for professional associations to track, record and publicise the deaths of their members, and such efforts should be encouraged.

An intermittent but internally-consistent tally of Iraqi security forces deaths — presumably sourced from Iraqi officials — has been provided by US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld. This had reached 86 by November 2003, grew to 325 by June 2004, 721 by September 2004, and 1,392 by mid-February 2005. These figures are again not directly comparable to IBC’s because we include prospective as well as signed-up recruits and exclude National Guards and other paramilitaries killed in combat situations. The broad agreement with our figures does however suggest that, as argued above, our coverage of security-related occupations is relatively complete when compared to other professions (except perhaps for journalists and high-profile individuals, who are also fairly well-covered in our database).

Note on military and security inclusions and exclusions

This report (and the IBC database) includes civilians and ordinary police, but not counter-insurgency police special forces, commandos, paramilitaries, Iraqi National Guards or recruits of the New Iraqi Army. Nor does it contain anti-occupation militias, suicide bombers or other combatants reported killed by the US military or Iraqi security forces. We do include any of the above under the occasional circumstances of their being killed/executed in captivity when, by virtue of being captured, these military had lost their capacity and status as combatants and could have expected to be treated under the provisions of the Geneva conventions for prisoners of war. Retired or otherwise (permanently) inactive soldiers are also included — there are of 16 of these in the table overleaf under “Ex-military” — as are civilians who were killed while queuing up to join any of the government forces listed above.

We include in our count foreign diplomats, aid workers, media workers, tourists, pilgrims, students, and non-Iraqis whose ties to Iraq pre-date the 2003 invasion and occupation. However, we exclude foreign civilian (or semi-civilian security) workers and contractors.

1 International Federation of Journalists (www.ifj.org)
WHO WERE THE KILLERS?

- US-led forces were sole killers of 37% of civilian victims.
- Criminals killed 36% of all civilians.
- Anti-occupation forces were sole killers of 9% of civilian victims.
- US military forces accounted for 98.5% of ‘Coalition’ killings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Killers by category</th>
<th>Number killed</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. US-led forces alone</td>
<td>9,270</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anti-occupation forces alone</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Both US-led and anti-occupation forces involved</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MoH-defined ‘military actions’</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MoH-defined ‘terrorist attacks’</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Predominantly criminal killings</td>
<td>8,935</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Unknown agents</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total deaths</td>
<td>24,865</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Categories of killers

On an incident by incident basis the killing of civilians was attributable to four broad groups: **US-led forces**, among whom the US itself played by far the leading role; **anti-occupation forces**, defined as armed forces attacking military and other occupation-related targets; **unknown agents**, defined as those who do not attack obvious military/strategic or occupation-related targets; and **criminals**. Some incidents involved combinations of these forces. The chart above shows the relative proportion of deaths attributable to these groups over the whole two-year period. There was US-led involvement in 42.3% of civilian deaths (totals of rows 1, 3, and 4).

Which coalition forces killed civilians?
The vast majority of coalition-caused deaths (98.5%) were attributable to US forces. The 1.5% of deaths caused by other coalition forces are: UK 86, Italy 23, Ukraine 13, Private security contractors 9, Denmark 6, Poland 2, Netherlands 1, Spain 1. Not included here are deaths resulting from joint actions (e.g. bombing raids including the USA and other coalition partners).

“Before the war, there was a strong government, strong security. There were a lot of police on the streets and there were no illegal weapons,” he said during an AP reporter’s visit to the morgue. “Now there are few controls. There is crime, revenge killings, so much violence.”

x334 Morgue records show 5,500 Iraqis killed. Daniel Cooney & Omar Sinan. Associated Press, 24 May 2004
CATEGORIES OF KILLERS

**US-led forces**
Different considerations apply during the invasion phase (which we define as 20 March to 30 April 2003) and the post-invasion phase (from 1 May 2003 to the end of the period). During the invasion phase all deaths which occurred as a direct result of US-led military offensives have been attributed to US-led forces alone. This is because (a) the great majority of civilian deaths reported in this so-called ‘shock and awe’ phase resulted from US-led air attacks – primarily bombing raids (see The Killers fact sheet 3), for which Iraqi forces could share no responsibility; and (b) there were no comparable Iraqi military offensives reported for this period. Deaths by criminal action (e.g. theft, looting) or inter-ethnic tensions (e.g. revenge killings) did, however, take place in the invasion phase, and are classified accordingly. From May 2003 when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority became the de-facto government, and was authorised by the UN to assume the responsibilities of an occupying power, clear reports of specific planned offensives by anti-occupation forces and other unknown agents began to allow civilian deaths to be assigned to single or multiple aggressors as appropriate, according to the reported circumstances of the incident in question.

**Anti-occupation forces**
A killer (or group of killers) is identified as anti-occupation when media reports make it clear that their targets were either US-led Coalition personnel or Iraqis working for, or in collaboration with, the Coalition forces. Whether the current situation in Iraq is strictly an occupation is irrelevant to this classification: it is sufficient that the anti-occupation forces see themselves as such.

**Both US-led and anti-occupation forces**
Where deaths occurred as a result of military clashes between US-led forces and their anti-occupation opponents, those killed have been classified as victims of both aggressors – caught in crossfire. There were 623 civilians killed in media-reported direct crossfire incidents between US-led and anti-occupation forces. However, to this total must be added two thirds of deaths reported by the Ministry of Health as resulting from ‘military actions’ (see below).

**Iraq Ministry of Health (MoH)**
The MoH has stated that its tally of civilian casualties has, since June 2004, been sorted into two categories: “Casualties of car bombs and other clearly identifiable terrorist attacks are recorded as being caused by terrorist incidents. All other casualties are recorded as military action… The casualties may have been killed or injured by terrorist or coalition forces. Coalition forces include Iraqi police, Iraqi security forces, and the Multi-National forces.” The split between these two categories of killers was reported as approximately one third ‘terrorist attacks’ and two thirds ‘military actions’ in which US-led forces as well as their opponents have been involved. We have integrated these into our data accordingly.

**Predominantly criminal killings**
Mortuary-reported deaths provide the most accurate measure of everyday criminal violence in Iraq. Deaths added to the IBC Database and included in this study are only those over and above the very low ‘background’ levels of such violence recorded pre-invasion, which averaged 14 per month in 2002.

Most of the deaths currently recorded by mortuaries, and in particular the Baghdad city mortuary which provides the bulk of IBC’s mortuary data, are said to be connected to criminal activity and distinct from war-related deaths as recorded by MoH: “The vast majority [of the dead recorded by mortuaries] did not die for reasons directly related to the insurgency but as the result of the crime wave scouring the capital’s streets.” Mortuary deaths should therefore be considered as primarily, but not entirely, crime-related – as the LA Times reported, “In some cases, authorities say, the motives are so opaque that they cannot tell whether they are investigating a crime disguised as an act of war or a political assassination masquerading as a violent business dispute.”

**Unknown agents**
When we could not be sure that targets were occupation-related we classified the killers as ‘unknown agents’. This included attacks which apparently targeted only civilians and lacked any identifiable military objective – for instance suicide bombs in markets and mosques, or attacks apparently motivated by personal or inter-group vendettas. This category also included 334 individual killings where media reports provided no clear information about the killer. The ‘unknown agents’ category is therefore likely to overlap to an extent with the ‘crime’ and ‘anti-occupation forces’ categories, but may also overlap with the ‘US-led forces’ category, since some of those killed were clearly opposed to the military occupation.

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1 Knight Ridder 25 Sep 2004; Dr Shakir Al-ainachi
D.G. Medical operations Ministry of Health, HMGov Freedom of Information request by Edward Hibbert.

2 Morgue records show 5,500 Iraqis killed.

3 6,634 bodies found in Baghdad mortuary.

4 Crime as lethal as warfare in Iraq. Monte Morin.
WHEN DID THEY DO THEIR KILLING?

- 30% of civilian deaths occurred during the invasion phase before 1 May 2003.
- Post-invasion, the number of civilians killed was almost twice as high in year two (11,351) as in year one (6,215).
- Post-invasion deaths caused by US-led forces peaked between April and November 2004.
- Deaths caused by anti-occupation forces, crime and unknown agents have shown a steady rise over the entire period.

Deaths caused by US-led forces
The monthly and per-day distribution of post-invasion deaths caused solely by US-led forces is shown in the first graph. The vast majority of these deaths were caused during the first half of the invasion phase, from 20 March to 9 April 2003. The intensity of deaths per day during these 21 days is too high to represent on the graph; a thumbnail image to scale is provided. The two later peaks coincide with the two US assaults on Al Fallujah in April and November 2004.

Deaths caused by others
The monthly numbers of violent deaths caused by crime, unknown agents and anti-occupation forces (see The Killers fact sheet 1 for definitions) are shown in the second graph. The number of killings not directly involving US-led forces regularly match and sometimes outnumber even the two (post-invasion) peaks in US-led violence, and show an inexorable rise apparently unaffected by US-led campaigns to “root out the insurgents and terrorists.” In particular they show that there was an increase, not a decrease, in civilian deaths caused by non-US-led parties after the two major assaults on Al Fallujah in April and November 2004.

A fresh car bomb attack killed 17 people south of Baghdad, as violence continued to engulf Iraq ahead of the announcement of the country’s election results.

Agence France Presse, 12 February 2005
Discussion & Notes

The most intense killing of civilians occurred during the first three weeks of the invasion (prior to the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003), but most of the data on these deaths emerged over the following weeks. This makes it difficult to precisely apportion deaths to the three-week period from 10 April until 1 May (when major combat operations were announced by George W Bush to be over). However, there was certainly some residual fighting taking place during this period. On the basis of available evidence, we have represented deaths in the period 10-30 April as occurring at the average rate for the entire two-year period, with the overwhelming remainder of the ‘invasion phase’ deaths being allocated to the initial three week period (20 March – 9 April). The period to 30 April 2003 accounted for 7,299 deaths in total, or 29.4% of all deaths in the entire two-year period. Another 6,215 were killed during the first post-invasion year, and in the second, 11,315. This means that – not counting the military invasion phase – deaths in the second year have almost doubled in comparison to the first year. Overall, the trend in civilian deaths has been upwards since the start of the UN-sanctioned occupation of May 2003.

Deaths caused by US-led forces

The total number of civilians killed by US-led forces alone was 9,270. 74% of these deaths (6,882) occurred in the invasion phase up to 1 May 2003. Of the remaining 2,388 post-invasion deaths, 292 (12%) occurred in the first year up to end of March 2004, and the remaining 2,096 (88%) occurred in the second year (this does not include 1,047 possible ‘crossfire’ deaths also involving anti-occupation forces).

The monthly distribution of post-invasion deaths caused solely by US-led forces is shown right. The two peaks coincide with the two US assaults on Al Fallujah in April and November 2004. The bulge in deaths from July-October 2004 coincides with a period of intense conflicts between Iraqi anti-occupation militias and US-led forces. Of 412 post-invasion deaths involving both US-led and anti-occupation forces – effectively deaths of bystanders caught in crossfire – just over half (217) were caused in this four-month period alone, as were 55% of the deaths in this dossier which are derived from the ‘military operations’ section of Iraqi Ministry of Health records (351 of 635 deaths). This period was also notable for its concentration of air attacks on urban targets which produced particularly high civilian casualties in Al Falluja (299), Kut (84), Tal Afar (55), and Samarra (54). Fifty-five reported air strikes during these four months led to the death of 547 civilians, or 72% of all reported post-invasion deaths from air strikes outside the two major assaults on Al Fallujah in April and November 2004.

Deaths caused by others

The total number of civilians killed by all non-US-led agents after 1 May was 14,131 (not including 1,047 possible ‘crossfire’ deaths also involving US-led forces). 41.5% of these deaths (5,871) occurred in the first year (up to 30 March 2004) with the remaining 58.5% (8,260) occurring in the 2nd year. 8,894 deaths were primarily crime-related murders recorded by mortuaries – 4,520 being reported in year one and 4,374 in year two. Unlike other causes of death these have remained relatively constant across the two year period. It is important to note that the mortuary-based figures given here are excess deaths as a result of the US-led invasion (i.e. comparable pre-invasion death rates have been subtracted from the monthly totals, alongside other conservative adjustments. For more information about the precise calculations, see for instance http://www.iraqbodycount.org/details/x132s_note.php)

Deaths caused per month by US-led forces and others. Does not include deaths where causation is shared by US-led forces and their opponents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>US-led Forces</th>
<th>Anti-occupation forces, unknown agents and crime</th>
<th>Per day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Mar-9 Apr 03</td>
<td>6,616</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30 Apr 03</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 03</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 03</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 03</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 03</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 03</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 03</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 03</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 04</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 04</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 04</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 04</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 04</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 04</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 04</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 04</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>21.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 04</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 04</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 04</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 04</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 05</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 05</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-19 Mar 05</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHAT WEAPONRY WAS USED?

- More than half (53%) of civilian deaths involved explosive devices.
- Air strikes caused most (64%) of the explosives deaths.
- Children were disproportionately affected by all explosive devices but most severely by air strikes and unexploded ordnance.
- 4.3% of civilians were killed by suicide and 3.4% by non-suicide vehicle bombs (car bombs).
- Small arms fire caused a relatively small proportion (8%) of deaths from conflict but almost all criminal murders.

Assessing the precision of weapons

Weapons information was available for 23,221 civilians killed. The table below categorises weapons used during the invasion and subsequent conflict in Iraq in terms of their effect on those civilians. If it is assumed that adults, not children, are the intended targets in war, the proportion of children to adults killed by different types of weaponry can be used as a measure of their indiscriminateness. ‘Precision’ and high-power, high-technology weaponry cause a higher-ratio of child-to-adult deaths than relatively primitive devices such as handheld firearms and manually-triggered roadside bombs. It appears that whatever their military advantages and benefit to soldiers, ‘stand-off’ weapons which put a substantial distance between soldiers and their intended targets are the most likely to cause unintended harm to bystanders. Lowest in ‘child lethality’ were handheld firearms, which suggests that clearly-identifiable civilians are more likely to be spared when combatants are able to personally control and direct their fire.

Assessing the precision of weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS TYPES</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>% of 23,221</th>
<th>Killed per incident</th>
<th>Invasion phase</th>
<th>Post-invasion</th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Child</th>
<th>% Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosives involved</td>
<td>12,385</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,883</td>
<td>5,502</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft involved</td>
<td>7,961</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms alone</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives alone, single-day incidents only</td>
<td>4,445</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>5.0/6</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft alone, single-day incidents only</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms alone, single-day incidents only</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle bombs alone, suicide</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle bombs alone, non-suicide</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadside bombs</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded ordnance alone, incl. cluster bombs</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime – “nearly all from gunfire”</td>
<td>8,935</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8,894</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some rows contain overlapping data, therefore columns should not be summed. ‘Post-invasion’ means after 1 May 2003.

* Based on MoH-reported proportions. See The Killed fact sheet 1.
Discussion & Notes

Explosives involved
This includes records in the database where explosives were used either in combination with other weapons, including small arms, or involved records covering more than a single day (most of these being invasion-phase battles). This category gives the most complete picture of the contribution to civilian deaths made by explosives – classified here as conventional and improvised bombs, missiles, suicide attacks, rocket-propelled grenades, artillery, air strikes, as well tanks and heavy-calibre gunfire. Although there is some admixture of small arms and other weapons in these entries, it is probably safe to assume that their contribution to the overall lethality was minor. More deaths occurred from explosive devices in the 42 days to May 1st 2003 – the ‘invasion phase’ – than in the 22½ months thereafter.

Aircraft involved
This includes air strikes even when they also involved other weapons (for instance, as part of support for ground troops), or when they ranged over several days. Again, these occurred mostly during the invasion phase, and belong entirely to US-led forces – 69% of whose aerial killing of civilians took place in this period.

Small arms alone, and Small arms alone, single-day incidents only
Single-day incidents are listed separately in the table to allow a more accurate estimate of the per-incident lethality of small arms. Mixtures of small arms and other, heavier weapons are not given in the table because the evidently greater lethality of heavier weapons in combined incidents will tend to ‘swamp’ the contribution of small arms.

Small arms – meaning firearms that can be hand-held – feature as the unique cause of death in more of IBC’s database entries than any other type of weapon. Because they kill relatively few civilians per incident their death toll in these 703 entries amounts to 1,901, less than half the number of deaths in single-day explosives-only incidents. It may be that this simply reflects their reduced lethality in comparison to heavy weaponry, and not their greater ‘precision’ as tools of warfare. However the much smaller proportion of children killed by small arms (6.3%) compared to the other weapons discussed here suggests that they are in fact less indiscriminate.

Explosives alone, single-day incidents only
In order to obtain an ‘unmixed’ and accurate estimate for the civilian lethality of explosives alone, we list here single-day incidents in which explosives were the sole weapons used. The average number of deaths in these bomb attacks was 7, but ranged as high as 136.

Aircraft alone, single-day incidents only
These provide a method for testing the per-incident lethality to civilians of air strikes alone, and a measure of their indiscriminateness if it is assumed that civilians are not being targeted. On this scale air strikes on their own have the highest per-incident lethality to civilians and the third-highest lethality to children, who constitute 42.3% of air strike victims.

Vehicle bombs alone, suicide
These were usually car bombs, but also included other vehicles. A single bombing in September 2004 (k659) accounted for the majority of child deaths caused by these driver-controlled devices. This incident excepted (which pushed overall child lethality from around 9% to over 19% of victims), these devices are most often steered onto their intended adult targets. A lowered proportion of child casualties also holds for suicide attacks which are not vehicle-borne. Of 181 such suicide-bomb deaths where the age of the victim was known, 162 were adults and 19 were children (10.5%)

Vehicle bombs alone, non-suicide
Not all car bombs are suicides: they appear in our database in roughly equal numbers to car bombs which are mechanically triggered (nor are all suicide attacks vehicle-borne – see previous paragraph). These, like suicide car bombs, are of somewhat reduced lethality for children compared to explosive devices overall.

Roadside bombs
These are improvised devices which are manually triggered when a military convoy passes over or near them. Their child lethality is relatively low, as is their contribution to civilian deaths generally. Nonetheless they have killed at least 15 children and 233 civilians overall.

Unexploded ordnance, including cluster bombs
The highest proportion of child deaths is caused by unexploded ordnance, where children constitute by far the majority of victims (cluster bombs here are considered only in their ‘post-attack’ state, not as direct weapons of bombardment, in which capacity they also kill and maim children). These are weapons which may not be designed to target children but this is effectively what they do, killing three times as many children as adults. Most of their harm appears to be caused when they lie thickest on the ground during and shortly after a war. However, they remain a low-level source of death (and injury) for many months afterwards and clearing them should be a high priority for any government that has the power to effect this.

Crime – “nearly all from gunfire”
While small arms appear to make a (relatively) small contribution to civilian deaths in war- and occupation-related incidents, they have remained the single greatest threat to civilian security throughout almost the whole period under study. According to Iraqi municipal mortuaries nearly all the criminal murders they see have been caused by hand guns. Bullets fired from such guns have claimed the lives of some 8,935 Iraqis since April 2003, when US-led forces displaced the existing regime. Mortuary staff claim that these deaths now have little direct connection to military and paramilitary operations in Iraq, but represent the increased opportunities for crime following the post-invasion breakdown of law and order. This is reinforced by statistics showing that such deaths have remained fairly constant throughout the two-year period and peaked in August 2003, long before the anti-occupation war had grown to its current scale.

Fire and metal shards from the blast ripped through the crowd of job applicants as well as the nearby vegetable and fruit market, which was filled with women and children shopping for their daily produce.

k91 Suicide car bomber kills 115, wounds 146 outside clinic. Jackie Spinner and Saad Sarhan. Washington Post, 1 March 2005
WHO WAS WOUNDED?

■ 42,500 civilians were reported wounded.
■ There were over three wounded for every death.
■ Adult males constitute over 88% of the injured and women and children 6% each.
■ Injuries to limbs and the head were the most commonly reported.

How many were injured?
Injuries information was available for 1,349 of the 1,629 entries in the IBC database in the 2003-2005 time frame. This covers 13,424 deaths and 42,500 injuries, a ratio of 3.17 injuries for every death.

What were the occupations of the injured?
As with the killed, the largest single identified occupational group suffering post-invasion injuries were those working in the security sector – principally policemen.

What was the nature of their injuries?
Details about the nature of injuries was provided by media reports for only 329 victims. The table below shows the main categories of injury, with numbers and indicative examples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of injury</th>
<th>Specific examples</th>
<th>Numbers in category</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limb injuries</td>
<td>Limb lost, foot lost, hand injured</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torso injuries</td>
<td>Abdominal injury, neck injury, back injury</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head injuries</td>
<td>Eye lost, face injured, ear injured</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: identified by cause</td>
<td>Shrapnel wounds, burns</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>identified rather than location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Kudair Hazber Razaq, a senior physician at the hospital, listed the terrible sights he saw in three days of fighting for control of the town [Nasiriyah]: the boy of 11 with a tiny chest wound who took an hour to die; the mother who arrived at his hospital trying to push her three-year-old daughter’s liver back into the child’s ripped abdomen; the middle-aged man who lost his right leg during the war against Iran, and whose left leg was amputated after his home was attacked by a US Cobra helicopter.”

x038 Cholera fears add to postwar power problems. Ian Cobain. Times (London), 14 April 2003
Discussion & Notes

How many were Injured?
The IBC total of 42,500 is an actual count, and not the result of rounding. The comparisons of deaths to injuries in this document are based only on deaths where the number of injuries could also be determined, ranging from zero to several hundreds and more. Deaths where such information was absent are not included in the calculations of injury to death ratios.

Of the 280 entries and 11,441 deaths for which no accompanying injury information is available, 8,913 were recorded by mortuaries. Mortuary records by their nature lack injury data, but as the deaths recorded by mortuaries are predominantly criminal murders — almost all of which are attributed to small arms fire — we assume that the ratio of injuries to deaths is relatively low — approximately 1 wounded for every 2 deaths (see The Wounded fact sheet 2 for more on these ratios). This means that our injuries count may have missed approximately 4,500 injuries, a number equivalent to half the dead recorded by mortuaries.

Injury information is lacking for a further 2,528 deaths reported by sources other than mortuaries. If these deaths are assumed to follow the general ratio of 3.17 injuries per death seen in non-mortuary reported deaths in this study, then a further 8,014 injured may have been missed by IBC. Combined with the unreported injuries possibly associated with mortuaries this would mean that IBC may be missing approximately 12,500 injuries from its current total of 42,500 (implying a total injuries count of 55,000 rather than 42,500).

Nature of injuries
Injury categories sum to more than the number of people whose injuries were described because several reports identify more than one injury to the same victim. The majority of injuries (70%) are to limbs and head. The high numbers of explicit mentions of shrapnel and burns is consistent with the type of injury caused by bombs and artillery.

Women and Children
Age or gender information was available for 12,172 of the 42,500 wounded recorded by IBC. Of these, 10,563 were adult males, 724 were adult women, and 741 were children under 18. The proportion of children reported injured (6%) was lower than the proportion of children reported killed (9.3%). This may be a reporting bias — child deaths are particularly newsworthy — or it may be that children are more likely to be killed by trauma injuries which adults would have survived.

Severity of injuries
Injuries can range from minor abrasions to essential organ damage and complete lifelong immobility. Including such a range of injuries in a composite “body count” is problematical. Without detailed knowledge of every reported injury it is impossible to compile or categorise injuries in a way that gives appropriate weight to the severity of injury. Journalistic reporting has explored only a handful of cases (329 in our database), and journalists are rarely in a position to track the long-term fate of injured victims. Most injury reports are filed within hours — or at most days — of the injury concerned. Deaths, in contrast, are unitary and, in a sense, equal.

Quality of data considerations
The Iraq Body Count project has not conducted as comprehensive, detailed and methodologically rigorous data gathering on injuries as it has on deaths.

Nonetheless over 80% of the reports in our archive carry injury information, and it is on these reports that this report is based. Media reports detailing injuries without deaths are not collected by IBC. However it is unlikely that large-scale injury incidents would have occurred without causing at least some deaths. In addition, our sources are complemented by data gathered by appropriate bodies such as hospitals and, in particular, injury data compiled by the Iraqi Ministry of Health between May and December 2004. The latter source has added 10,257 injuries (after correction for duplicate entries) to our total of injuries.

IBC’s tally of injured is derived from reported injuries associated with the deaths of civilians. We have not, however, attempted to correct for the possible presence of anti- or pro-occupation Iraqi combatants among the injured, other than excluding any wounded explicitly described as combatants. Unlike the dead, all wounded are defined by their condition after receiving their injuries. From that point on they are simply the war-wounded and are accorded the same consideration and rights to appropriate medical treatment as all others. The number of injured far exceeds evolving estimates of insurgent numbers, and we are confident that the great majority of injured reported here are, indeed, non-combatants.
WHEN & HOW WERE THEY WOUNDED?

■ At least 21,000 of 42,500 reported injuries were caused by US-led forces.

■ The invasion phase before 1 May 2003 saw by far the highest concentration of wounded per day and contains 41% of reported injuries for the entire period.

■ Explosive weaponry generally produced a higher ratio of injuries to deaths than small arms.

■ The highest wounded-to-death ratio incidents occurred during the invasion phase.

Who caused the injuries and with what weapons?
21,171 of injuries were caused by US-led forces, 4,992 by anti-occupation forces, 1,249 by a combination of both, and 4,831 by unknown agents (see upper table overleaf). An additional 10,257 cases were derived from Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) records, which the MoH describes as approximately one third due to ‘terrorist attacks’ and two thirds arising from ‘military operations’ involving coalition forces and others. The proportion of injuries occurring in situations where coalition weapons were being used is 68.6% of the total.

Weaponry used
The weapons causing the greatest number of injuries were explosive devices, broadly defined as air- or ground-launched bombs, improvised explosive devices and artillery. These were the sole cause of injury for 18,197 of the wounded, compared to 1,830 solely caused by small arms fire.

Death to injury ratios of weaponry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon type</th>
<th>Injury-to-death ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive devices alone</td>
<td>3.1 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms alone</td>
<td>1.2 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both explosives and small arms</td>
<td>4.0 to 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When did the injuries occur?
Of the 42,500 injuries recorded in total, 17,338 were inflicted during the period up to May 1st 2003. The phase of highest military activity lasted between 20 March and the displacement of the Baghdad regime on 9 April. During this phase over 760 wounded per day were seen by hospitals, 4 times higher than the daily rate of the worst post-2003 month, August 2004.
Discussion & Notes

Who caused the injuries and with what weapons?
MoH-reported injuries are allocated according to the same 2:1 ratio between military actions and terrorist attacks that were reported for deaths (see The Killers fact sheet 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Media-reported injuries</th>
<th>Percentage of total injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involving US-led forces weaponry</td>
<td>US-led forces</td>
<td>21,171</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both US-led and anti-occupation forces</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MoH-defined &quot;military actions&quot;</td>
<td>6,769</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non US-led forces weaponry</td>
<td>MoH-defined &quot;terrorist attacks&quot;</td>
<td>3,488</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-occupation forces</td>
<td>4,992</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown agents</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table showing proportions of injuries caused by different agents.

What accounts for injury variations?
High injury-to-death ratio incidents were particularly common during the invasion phase of the military intervention. Of the 12 highest-ratio incidents, five occurred between 21 March and 6 April 2003 and accounted for 1,267 of the 1,826 wounded in these incidents.

Death to injury ratios of weaponry
In most circumstances explosive weaponry of all kinds — including bombs delivered by air strikes, artillery, and improvised explosive devices — have a higher injury-to-death ratio, as well as absolute destructive power, than small arms. This is a direct measure of their general indiscriminateness, however 'precisely' targeted. In incidents where explosive devices of one kind or another were the sole weapons, the ratio of injuries to deaths was 3.1:1.

Where small arms alone were used, the injury-to-death ratio was considerably lower at 1.2:1. But when both small arms and explosives were involved the ratio increased again to 4.0:1, higher than when explosives had been used alone. This could be due to the nature of the incidents involved, so that in protracted or high-intensity battles the harm to bystanders is increased. To test this hypothesis we examined the ratio of deaths to injuries in incidents where
(a) only US-led forces fired their weapons
(b) only anti-occupation forces fired their weapons
(c) where both were involved, e.g. in gun battles and (d) where unaligned/unknown agents (defined as those who do not attack military targets) were involved.

The ratios were (a) 1.4:1, (b) 0.8:1, (c) 3.52:1 and (d) 0.55:1. This suggests that when small arms are used in the context of a battle between two forces their potential for so-called 'collateral damage' is on a par with explosive weaponry, although the absolute level of destruction — human as well as material — remains substantially higher for explosives.

When did the Injuries occur?
The chart overleaf shows the daily rate as well as the peak totals per month with a comparison (black bars) to the numbers killed. This includes only deaths for which injury information — from zero injuries and upwards — was available (details on table at left).

The per day measure is particularly important for injuries because above a certain level this will exceed the capacity of hospitals to treat the wounded, and the more impoverished the medical system the more quickly this point will be reached.

Complete timeline details are provided on the table at left.
WHO WERE THE WITNESSES IN IRAQ?

- Mortuary officials and medics were the most frequently reported witnesses.
- Police have become increasingly significant as primary sources over time.

Who were the witnesses on the ground?
Press and media reports have relied on primary sources on the ground in Iraq for their data. Iraqis are the main victims in this conflict, but they are also the ones who have most clearly articulated their experience of war to the world. It is normal journalistic practice to whenever possible cite primary sources, so that IBC has been able to attach a very large proportion of reported deaths to specific primary sources. The table below shows the total number of deaths reported by each category of primary source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Source</th>
<th>Number of deaths reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortuaries</td>
<td>8,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>4,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi officials</td>
<td>4,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyewitnesses</td>
<td>3,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>2,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Coalition</td>
<td>2,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends/Associates</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mortuary officials and medics constitute the largest category of witness. This is perhaps unsurprising, since it is part of their official role to witness and record deaths, and they contributed some large cumulative totals through reports spanning significant periods and geographical areas.

Did primary sources change over time?
Mortuaries provided information on the largest number of deaths in 14 of the 24 individual monthly periods, ending December 2004. Medics were the largest source in 3 months (the March-April 2003 invasion phase and the April 2004 assault on Al Fallujah). Relatives of victims were the largest source in November 2004, and the first 3 months of 2005 saw the Iraqi police become the largest source.

“We were working day and night,” said Dr. Abbas Timimi, director of Abu Ghraib General Hospital on the city’s western outskirts. “With so many people so badly hurt, we felt so much pressure to be treating patients instead of filling out forms. But we’d always scribble something.” Doctors and nurses knew that for survivors seeking dead relatives, any scrap of information would help.

x079 Baghdad’s death toll assessed. Laura King. Los Angeles Times, 18 May 2003
**Discussion & Notes**

**Primary sources**

For each incident we have recorded all primary sources mentioned in the media reports (there was frequently more than one primary source cited for a particular incident).

Category definitions were as follows: Medics included all medical professionals (doctors, nurses, ambulance drivers) as well as hospital administrators, but not including medical staff working at mortuaries – these were listed as mortuary sources. Iraqi Officials included all spokespersons of the Iraqi Government at both local and national level, including Ministry officials and local government officials. US / Coalition included all non-Iraqi official spokespersons (including US Government, US Military – both on the ground and in the Green Zone, and other Coalition partners). An eyewitness was someone who was quoted as directly witnessing a death. Friends and associates included colleagues, neighbours or travelling companions (e.g. in the same car).

**Iraqi official sources**

These have been of three main types:

a. During March-April 2003. During the ‘invasion phase’ from 19 March to 9 April 2003, an important source of data for our count were the official releases from the Iraqi Ministry of Information. Soon after the war it was discovered that wherever independent verification was possible the Iraqi Government’s figures (which had apparently been communicated to them by hospitals) were either entirely accurate, or underestimates of the true picture. By the end of Summer 2003, all but 130 of the Iraqi-reported deaths had been confirmed by, and incorporated in, reports from other independent sources.

b. Mortuaries. The IBC-reported mortuary totals are substantially less than the totals appearing in media reports. This is principally because IBC removes from such data any deaths which have already been reported and would lead to duplicate entries if both were included. Data are also corrected for 2002 death rates because criminal murders were of course present before the war: only those murders in excess of (the very low) 2002 rates are included by IBC. Finally, a subtraction has also been made for the possible presence of insurgents among the mortuary-reported dead. This is a conservative measure undertaken despite the view commonly expressed by mortuary staff that the deaths they record are principally criminal murders (unlike the MoH – see next paragraph).

c. Iraqi Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health’s Operations Center (Ops Center), which monitors war-related casualty figures, was established to direct the Ministry’s response to “pockets of violence occurring throughout the country.” The MoH released these figures regularly during the summer of 2004, but has since done so much less frequently.

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WHO TOLD THE WORLD?

- Authors frequently obtain casualty information from more than one primary source.
- Iraqi journalists are increasingly central to the reporting work.
- 3 press agencies provided over one third of all stories in the database.
- IBC’s data yield casualty totals comparable to other systematic surveys.

How well did journalists source their totals?
On a cautious criterion, 74% of incidents reported at least one primary source, and 23% of incidents reported two or more primary sources. The table on the right shows the percentage of reports in which a given primary source was supported by others.

80% of mortuary-recorded victims have only the mortuary as a primary source. In other cases a primary source is more often than not accompanied by at least one further source. This is most likely to be the case for unofficial sources (journalists, relatives, eyewitnesses, friends). It appears that these sources are used by journalists primarily for human interest, but are backed up, in the great majority of cases, by other official sources such as Iraqi officials, medics, the police, or US officials. Journalists, therefore, tend to rely on expert sources in the majority of their work.

Who researched the stories?
A significant and continuing "exodus" of Western journalists has characterised the post-invasion period. This is partly due to decline in editorial interest, even more to security concerns. Over 50 journalists and media workers have themselves been killed in the conflict (see The Killed – fact sheet 3). Current reporting is increasingly undertaken by Iraqi staff working for western media outlets, with Iraqi names now appearing more regularly as authors or coauthors. Western journalists have always relied on Iraqi assistants (drivers, interpreters, etc.). In a very real sense, therefore, the IBC database increasingly depends on the bravery and dedication of Iraqi media workers continuing to risk life and limb to inform the world about the situation in their country.

Which media outlets published the reports used by IBC?
All of the data presented in this report was derived from press and media reports published by 152 English-language outlets conforming to IBC’s criteria (see discussion). However, over two thirds of the reports used derive from just 24 of these outlets, with ten outlets between them providing over half the reports. Three press agencies, Associated Press, Agence France Presse, and Reuters, between them provided over one third of all reports.

Other sources used more than 20 times each are (in descending order of frequency): Knight Ridder (USA); New York Times; Washington Post; CNN; Guardian (UK); Middle East Online; Independent (UK); Pakistan Daily Times; Gulf Daily News; Times (UK); British Broadcasting Corporation; Telegraph (UK); CBS; Sydney Morning Herald; United Press International; Chicago Tribune; Pakistan Tribune; Boston Globe; ABC News Online (Australia); Arab News.
Discussion & Notes

How well did journalists source their casualty reports?
For a primary source (e.g. eyewitness or official) to be added to this analysis, we adopted a cautious criterion. The author of the report had to explicitly state that the primary source was the source of information for a particular death. We did not infer the primary source where, for instance, such a source might have been mentioned earlier in the same press report in relation to different deaths; even though such an inference could have been legitimate. This problem arises in many agency reports where it is typical to briefly mention a significant number of different incidents involving civilian deaths in a single report.

Which media reports were used?
All IBC sources are published on-line and comply with the following standards: (1) site updated at least daily; (2) all stories separately archived on the site, with a unique URL; (3) source widely cited or referenced by other sources; (4) English language site; (5) fully public (preferably free) web-access. Some sites remove items after a given time period, change their URLs, or place them in archives with inadequate search engines. For this reason it has been consistent project policy that URLs of IBC data base sources are not published on the Iraqbodycount.org website.

The project relies on the professional rigour of the approved reporting agencies. It is assumed that any agency that has attained a respected international status operates its own rigorous checks before publishing items. By requiring that two independent approved outlets publish a report before we add it to the count, we are premising our own work on the self-correcting nature of the interconnected international media network.

We have not made use of Arabic or other non English language sources, except where these have been published in English. The reasons are pragmatic. We consider fluency in the language of the published report to be a key requirement for accurate analysis, and English is the only language in which all team members are fluent. It is possible that our count has excluded some victims as a result.

Who else has undertaken large-scale studies of Iraqi civilian deaths?
A number of organisations have undertaken small-scale or time-limited investigations of civilian deaths. A detailed account of 15 known projects begun during the invasion phase or 2003 is given in the IBC report “Counting the Human Cost”, June 2003.

Besides IBC, only two published investigations have taken a whole-country perspective covering more than a year of the conflict. These are two cluster-sample surveys. The first was published in late October 2004 (Lancet), and the second in May 2005 (UNDP).

Lancet Survey
This survey sampled 988 households in 33 randomly-selected neighbourhoods intended to be representative of the country as a whole. The study assessed “excess deaths” when compared to an equivalent pre-invasion period. However, more than half of the excess deaths had been found in a single cluster of homes in Al Fallujah, and this extreme statistical outlier was left out of national projections to avoid excessive imprecision (uncertainty). This produced a nation-wide estimate of 98,000 deaths between 19 March 2003 and mid-September 2004, of which 57,600 would have been due to violence and the remainder caused by accidents, infections and chronic diseases (based on the breakdown of causes seen in their reduced sample). The survey did not distinguish between military and civilian deaths, and there was a wide error margin associated with the central estimate (8,000 – 194,000 at the 95% confidence interval). A highly creditable and often overlooked aspect of the Lancet survey is that it systematically obtained information on post-invasion excess deaths from all causes, including the everyday deaths that don’t make the news. Such efforts should be joined.

COST/UNDP Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS).
This UN Development Program-funded ILCS sampled 21,668 households in 2,200 neighbourhoods for a wide-ranging survey into the health and living conditions of Iraqis. Most of the data were gathered between March and May 2004 using similar random selection methods and extrapolation techniques to the Lancet study. ILCS produced a nation-wide estimate of 24,000 conflict-related deaths with a 95% confidence interval from 18,000 to 29,000. No data from significant areas like Al Fallujah had to be excluded. ILCS includes only violent “war-related” deaths but, like the Lancet, does not distinguish between military and civilian deaths. It also excludes the criminal murders which form a substantial component of both IBC and Lancet data. With its far larger (and therefore more representative) sample and its exclusion of non war-related deaths, the ILCS estimate currently provides the most effective, albeit not perfectly-overlapping, survey-based counterpart to IBC’s count (which is a compilation of recorded deaths, not an estimate or projection).

1 http://www.iraqbodycount.org/editorial_june1203.htm
HOW WAS THIS DOSSIER RESEARCHED?

- 18 separate categories of information have been extracted (where available) for each of 1,629 media-reported database entries.
- All calculations have been made on the Iraq Body Count maximum estimates.
- Data analysis has been subject to rigorous internal checks.

How has the data for this dossier been compiled?
For this dossier, all IBC-archived media reports from the first two years of the conflict were analysed to extract the following information for each database entry (where available): (1) date, (2) time, (3) place, (4) target, (5) weapon, (6-7) minimum and maximum reported deaths, (8) published media sources, (9) killer(s), (10) primary witness(es), (11-12) minimum and maximum reported injuries. In addition, a victim database has been created, with an entry for each media-reported victim, either killed or injured. Where available, the following additional information has been extracted for each victim: (13) name, (14) age, (15) gender, (16) marital status, (17) parental status, (18) occupation.

Why has the max been used in calculations for this dossier?
We have chosen to conduct our analyses in this dossier on the basis of the maximum figures in our data base because (a) in the case of most media reports, data extraction did not necessitate a minimum which was different from the maximum, (b) at least two reliable media sources have put their professional reputations behind each max figure, (c) even our max figure is likely to under-represent the full toll, given that not every death is officially recorded or reported, (d) our max totals are more consistent with other independent published estimates, (e) in cases where new information has come to light requiring a revision of the death toll, this revision has almost always been upwards.

How reliable is the data?
IBC reliability is ensured by three main strategies. First, data entries incorporate variations in reporting, including (where appropriate) a minimum and maximum for reported deaths and injuries. Second, cross-checking, particularly for date, time and, place, is employed to avoid duplicate entries. Third, data is continually updated and collated through daily scans of all relevant media sources.

Has account been taken of pre-invasion deaths?
The IBC database has been adjusted to account for pre-invasion death rates where reliably known and where it is appropriate to do so. The principal adjustment has been in respect of the mainly crime-related deaths reported by mortuaries.

Are there any official counts of civilian casualties?
Neither the US nor UK governments have undertaken any official counts of civilian casualties. Incomplete Iraqi government counts commenced from April 2004.

Who has been involved in the work?
The IBC research team have been assisted principally by Oxford Research Group and the Sigrid Rausing Trust.

It is impossible to understand these actions without the context of George Bush and Tony Blair’s war on terror and its impact on the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Tens of thousands of innocent people have lost their lives in both countries since we invaded, yet not only is their pain not recognised, their deaths are not even recorded. Such are the double standards of our foreign policy.

Miqbaad Versi, a young British Muslim writing on the bombings in London of 7 July 2005. Guardian, 9 July 2005
Discussion & Notes

How has the data been compiled?
All calculations appearing in this dossier have been independently double-checked by at least two members of the team, and we intend to archive the raw data in a publicly accessible form for the use of other researchers so that they may perform their own checks and calculations on the data.

Why has the max been used in calculations for this dossier?
After the initial invasion phase, the min and max are generally identical. The most significant reporting differences occurred in the invasion phase. Just 26 entries, out of a total of 111 for this phase, accounted for well over half (1,650) of the cumulative difference of some 3,000 between the min and max for the whole period covered by this dossier. Two incidents (x073 and x079c) account for 938 of these deaths, and allow for uncertainties in two well-documented and major surveys of deaths in the Baghdad area conducted respectively by Knight Ridder Newspapers and the Los Angeles Times. The main uncertainty was whether all reported casualties were civilian.

How reliable is the data?
Data entries incorporate variations in reporting. Most variations are due to the placement of quoted eyewitnesses and other primary sources in relation to an incident: for instance a hospital doctor will almost certainly have a greater overview of an incident’s toll of casualties than a bystander. Where there are irrecconcilable reports of equal weight the database entry takes the form of a minimum and a maximum range incorporating this variation in numbers.

Data ‘tagging’ is employed to avoid duplicate entries. A standardized system of indicators to ‘flag’ incidents – Date, Time, Place, Targets, Weapons, etc. – is used to distinguish between entries and avoid double-counting errors. Here, too, the Min-Max system has been used whenever intractable uncertainties remain: e.g. an entry of 0 in the Min column, to allow for the possibility that a death already exists in the database, and 1 in the Max column, to allow for the possibility that it has not yet been recorded by IBC.

Has account been taken of pre-invasion deaths?
Where published data exist for comparable pre-invasion periods, and meaningful comparisons can be made, then appropriate pre-invasion totals have been subtracted to take account of deaths which could not be said to be a direct consequence of the invasion. These are predominantly deaths through criminal activity as reported by mortuaries, which would have constituted a continuing “background” level of crime-related deaths whether or not there had been a military invasion. The crime-related deaths reported by IBC are only those deaths which occurred over and above the level of such deaths as recorded pre-war. IBC does not make any adjustments for pre-invasion killings by the Saddam regime. The purpose of our work is to collect data on deaths which have clearly resulted from the US-led invasion. In addition, it may be noted that reliable pre-invasion estimates supplied by Amnesty International through their annual Human Rights Monitoring Reports showed that judicial and extra-judicial executions by the Iraqi regime numbered in the ‘hundreds’ up until 2000 and in the ‘scores’ in 2001 and 2002. Similarly, in assessing whether the invasion of Iraq could be considered a ‘humanitarian intervention’ Human Rights Watch has concluded that “the killing in Iraq at the time was not of the exceptional nature that would justify such intervention.”

Are there any official counts of civilian casualties?
Partial counts have been provided by different Iraqi authorities for portions of the period (see The Witnesses fact sheet 1), but these authorities have not produced any report covering the entire period.

Some 31 incidents in the IBC database were announced to the media by US officials as the subject of ongoing investigations (into the extent of US involvement in or culpability for legal infringements). 148 civilian deaths and 176 injuries were reported across all these incidents, with the largest 5 incidents accounting for 113 of the deaths. More typically, these incidents involved 1-3 deaths, and include instances of shootings at US checkpoints, deaths under detention or interrogation, civilians shot in error (when, for instance, mistaken for insurgents), or alleged over-reactions to demonstrations. It has proved difficult to discover whether the results of the majority these announced investigations were ever published. Deaths caused by US forces at checkpoints should be particularly amenable to investigation, as in the case of the shooting at the car carrying a released Italian hostage on 4 March 2005 (x439). Further information held by US authorities is contained in numerous records of compensation claims, both successful and unsuccessful. One part of this information was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Dayton Daily News, a local US newspaper (24 October 2004). All this information should be placed in the public domain.

Neither the US nor UK government has undertaken any official count of civilian casualties. In separate responses to questions in the UK Parliament, Bill Rammell, Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote:

“We have no way of reliably estimating the total number of Iraqi civilians killed by military or terrorist action.”

“The Ministry of Defence has not assisted the Iraqi Government efforts to collate casualty numbers. The MOD has not assisted other organisations with independent counts of civilian casualties and fatalities. We have no methodology which would allow us to produce accurate estimates.”

Who has been involved in the Iraq Body Count project?
The Iraq Body Count Project was founded in January 2003 by Hamit Dardagan and John Sloboda, at the point when it became clear that an invasion of Iraq was almost inevitable. Some 20 volunteers have been involved in the project, with commitments ranging up to full-time. For a full list of current team members see http://www.iraqbodycount.org/contacts.htm

3 Hansard. 10 January 2005.
4 Hansard. 11 January 2005.
GLOSSARY & QUICK REFERENCE

TERMINOLOGY

**Civilian** Children under 18, the vast majority of women, all non-combatants, ordinary (as opposed to paramilitary) police, prospective (as opposed to serving) military recruits, and all Iraqis killed in captivity, whatever their prior status and whoever their captors. Also included are Iraqis forced by immediate circumstances to use arms “when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” (UNHCR 1990). For details, see The Killed, fact sheet 2.

**US-led forces** Military and paramilitary forces of the United States and its allies, be they Iraqi or foreign. This includes political leadership as well as direct military command.

**Anti-occupation forces** Those who target US-led forces and who target ordinary police and other security forces, military installations and support workers for US-led forces.

**Unknown agents** Those who appear to attack civilian targets lacking a clear or unambiguous link to the foreign military presence in Iraq. This may include some overlap with the groups above as well as with criminal murders. For details, see The Killers fact sheet 1.

TIME FRAMES

The analyses in this dossier cover the first two years of the military intervention in Iraq from 20 March 2003 to 19 March 2005, and are based on data which was available by 14 June 2005.

SPELLING NOTES

Person-names are given as published in the media reports carrying them. Spellings of place-names and provinces (governorates) are as used by the UN’s Humanitarian Information Centre for Iraq (www.hiciraq.org).

SOURCES

IBC obtains nearly all its raw data from the English-language news media as published online (including some non-English reports as provided by their producers in translation). There are now 152 different sources cited in IBC’s database, but the most prevalent are the major newswires and US and UK newspapers. For selection criteria and other details, see The Witnesses fact sheet 3. Press extracts in this dossier are marked with the code number of the incident’s entry in the online IBC database.

THE IBC PROJECT

Since the beginning of the US-led military intervention the Iraq Body Count project has been continuously tracking, analysing and compiling reported civilian deaths and publishing them on its website www.iraqbodycount.org. The project team is a free association of concerned citizens living and working in the UK and the USA, who conduct the project through a specially-designed collaborative system making optimal use of volunteer time.

Our aim is to ensure that a regularly updated casualty count is maintained and published online for as long as civilian deaths and injuries occur in this military intervention. Whether we are able to fulfil this aim depends primarily on others, in particular the media who provide the raw information and those who provide IBC’s funding – most of it, so far, donations from the public. For details of the project in relation to this dossier see The Witnesses fact sheet 3.

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Oxford Research Group, 51 Plantation Road, Oxford, OX2 6JE, UK
Tel: +44 (0)1865 242819 Fax: +44 (0)1865 794652 org@oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk